Hi Scott, what a fabulous episode! I love the phraseology “the language of science”. Although science is just a single lens, I’m still a sucker for all things empirical! So this episode looks like the perfect blend of subjective experience and mathematical factoids! Can’t wait to give the full episode a listen - thanks for sharing!
«One way you can think about this is that all states of being are just different expressions or configurations of underlying math.» Do you have any reflections on the difference between «states of being» and «being»? Depending om how you define «state», it might be advantageous to clarify that the reducibility of (states of) being to math is an assumption of certain models of consciousness and/or being and not in any way a universal belief/fact/truth.
Mathematics includes paradox and conundrums. Which is to say, in some ways it isn't to be "boiled down." There's no way to boil down the square root of minus one, for example. It isn't to be summed up, either. The mathematical concept of the square root of minus one is a practical necessity for almost all electronic circuit design more complicated than a battery-powered filament light bulb, but when it comes to the thing itself, we're obliged to talk around it. We simply get used to the fact that it works marvelously for some purposes, while foregoing any attempt at rational understanding.
Also, there's no way to speak conceptually about math without doing it the way we conceptualize everything else: by using verbal language- words. Numbers are entirely denotative and discrete (although dynamic functions are inclined to leave a final quantified resolution elusive.) Verbal language is connotative- words hold their signal properties only in relation to other words, which are in turn connected to other words, etc. &c. In any given verbal exchange of ideas, some amount of semantic noise is practically inevitable. Very different than an algebra equation, or an algorithm.
The amount of signal and noise contained in a verbal exchange is a variable condition, of course. Context dependent.
For example, there's general agreement among conversant English users on the meaning of the word STOP, especially when it's heard issued as a command. That's a fairly unambiguous example of an easily defined language term with a low quotient of noise in its reception.
But unlike computer coding, verbal language does not consist entirely of commands. Verbal statements can be issued as direct orders, but for most purposes, orders aren't the currency of human communication. Generally speaking, verbal language consists of considerably more nuance and shadings of meaning than that conveyed by a direct order. Words don't resolve neatly, the way equations do. An identical string of words can be received and decoded very differently, depending on its context, which can have both verbal and nonverbal aspects. And also depending on the individual comprehension ability and disposition of the reader.
That can even be the case for single words, few of which partake of the unambiguous meaning associated with the word STOP.
Consider the coinage QUALIA. From the Wiki entry:
"American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce introduced the term quale in philosophy in 1866, and in 1929 C. I. Lewis was the first to use the term "qualia" in its generally agreed upon modern sense. Frank Jackson later defined qualia as "...certain features of the bodily sensations especially, but also of certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of purely physical information includes". Philosopher and cognitive scientist Daniel Dennett suggested that qualia was "an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us".
That's a lot of conceptual territory to fit underneath one language term. Is it possible that there's an element of idiosyncrasy in the way each of the human thinkers mentioned- Peirce, Lewis, Jackson, and Dennett- conceive of the notion of qualia? I think that's probably the case. Parsing the ramifications of "qualia" is a good deal more complicated than understanding the meaning of the word "stop."
Does the term "qualia" refer conceptually to a realm of cognition so vast that the capacity to contemplate all of its aspects- its connotations- is staggeringly incomplete, rather than meaningfully comprehensive? That's how it appears to me. Dennett's informal parsing of the definition of "qualia"- "the way things seem to us"- is less meaningful than he implies. It seems so to me, anyway.
The Wiki entry for "Qualia" continues with this passage:
"The nature and existence of qualia under various definitions remain controversial. Much of the debate over the importance of qualia hinges on the definition of the term, and various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain features of qualia. Some philosophers of mind, like Daniel Dennett, argue that qualia do not exist. Other philosophers, as well as neuroscientists and neurologists, believe qualia exist and that the desire by some philosophers to disregard qualia is based on an erroneous interpretation of what constitutes science..."
Hi Scott, what a fabulous episode! I love the phraseology “the language of science”. Although science is just a single lens, I’m still a sucker for all things empirical! So this episode looks like the perfect blend of subjective experience and mathematical factoids! Can’t wait to give the full episode a listen - thanks for sharing!
«One way you can think about this is that all states of being are just different expressions or configurations of underlying math.» Do you have any reflections on the difference between «states of being» and «being»? Depending om how you define «state», it might be advantageous to clarify that the reducibility of (states of) being to math is an assumption of certain models of consciousness and/or being and not in any way a universal belief/fact/truth.
Mathematics includes paradox and conundrums. Which is to say, in some ways it isn't to be "boiled down." There's no way to boil down the square root of minus one, for example. It isn't to be summed up, either. The mathematical concept of the square root of minus one is a practical necessity for almost all electronic circuit design more complicated than a battery-powered filament light bulb, but when it comes to the thing itself, we're obliged to talk around it. We simply get used to the fact that it works marvelously for some purposes, while foregoing any attempt at rational understanding.
Also, there's no way to speak conceptually about math without doing it the way we conceptualize everything else: by using verbal language- words. Numbers are entirely denotative and discrete (although dynamic functions are inclined to leave a final quantified resolution elusive.) Verbal language is connotative- words hold their signal properties only in relation to other words, which are in turn connected to other words, etc. &c. In any given verbal exchange of ideas, some amount of semantic noise is practically inevitable. Very different than an algebra equation, or an algorithm.
The amount of signal and noise contained in a verbal exchange is a variable condition, of course. Context dependent.
For example, there's general agreement among conversant English users on the meaning of the word STOP, especially when it's heard issued as a command. That's a fairly unambiguous example of an easily defined language term with a low quotient of noise in its reception.
But unlike computer coding, verbal language does not consist entirely of commands. Verbal statements can be issued as direct orders, but for most purposes, orders aren't the currency of human communication. Generally speaking, verbal language consists of considerably more nuance and shadings of meaning than that conveyed by a direct order. Words don't resolve neatly, the way equations do. An identical string of words can be received and decoded very differently, depending on its context, which can have both verbal and nonverbal aspects. And also depending on the individual comprehension ability and disposition of the reader.
That can even be the case for single words, few of which partake of the unambiguous meaning associated with the word STOP.
Consider the coinage QUALIA. From the Wiki entry:
"American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce introduced the term quale in philosophy in 1866, and in 1929 C. I. Lewis was the first to use the term "qualia" in its generally agreed upon modern sense. Frank Jackson later defined qualia as "...certain features of the bodily sensations especially, but also of certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of purely physical information includes". Philosopher and cognitive scientist Daniel Dennett suggested that qualia was "an unfamiliar term for something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways things seem to us".
That's a lot of conceptual territory to fit underneath one language term. Is it possible that there's an element of idiosyncrasy in the way each of the human thinkers mentioned- Peirce, Lewis, Jackson, and Dennett- conceive of the notion of qualia? I think that's probably the case. Parsing the ramifications of "qualia" is a good deal more complicated than understanding the meaning of the word "stop."
Does the term "qualia" refer conceptually to a realm of cognition so vast that the capacity to contemplate all of its aspects- its connotations- is staggeringly incomplete, rather than meaningfully comprehensive? That's how it appears to me. Dennett's informal parsing of the definition of "qualia"- "the way things seem to us"- is less meaningful than he implies. It seems so to me, anyway.
The Wiki entry for "Qualia" continues with this passage:
"The nature and existence of qualia under various definitions remain controversial. Much of the debate over the importance of qualia hinges on the definition of the term, and various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain features of qualia. Some philosophers of mind, like Daniel Dennett, argue that qualia do not exist. Other philosophers, as well as neuroscientists and neurologists, believe qualia exist and that the desire by some philosophers to disregard qualia is based on an erroneous interpretation of what constitutes science..."
So what are we talking about here, anyway?